University of Wollongong

Research Online
Coal Operators' Conference

Faculty of Engineering and Information
Sciences

2015

The Hazelwood Mine Fire 2014
David Cliff
University of Queensland

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/coal

Recommended Citation
David Cliff, The Hazelwood Mine Fire 2014, in Naj Aziz and Bob Kininmonth (eds.), Proceedings of the
2015 Coal Operators' Conference, Mining Engineering, University of Wollongong, 18-20 February 2019
https://ro.uow.edu.au/coal/578

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

2015 Coal Operators’ Conference

The University of Wollongong

THE HAZELWOOD MINE FIRE 2014
David Cliff1
ABSTRACT: On 9 February 2014 a fire began in the open cut brown coal mine at Hazelwood near
Morwell in Victoria. This fire burnt for 45 days before it was extinguished. The fire necessitated the
evacuation of parts of Morwell and required a major coordinated fire-fighting effort. The severity of the
fire and the impact upon the local community caused the Victorian Government to institute a Board of
Inquiry (Teague et al., 2014). This paper discusses the information presented to the Board of Inquiry into
this fire and the conclusions and recommendation of the Inquiry, focussing on what caused the fire and
what could be done to prevent a recurrence. This paper draws heavily on the Board’s published report of
over 430 pages (Teague et al., 2014) and is the source of the information unless otherwise stated.
INTRODUCTION
The Latrobe Valley coal reserves are unique and are characterised by a relatively thin layer of soil and
clay overburden covering massive coal seams that are on average 100 metres thick. This makes
accessing the vast brown coal reserves in the Latrobe Valley relatively easy compared with elsewhere in
the world.
The Hazelwood Mine provides approximately 25 per cent of Victoria’s baseline electricity supply. Coal
was first discovered at Morwell were discovered in the late nineteenth century by the Great Morwell Coal
Mining Company. The State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) acquired the Hazelwood mine
site in 1924. The SECV established the Hazelwood mine, then known as the Morwell Open Cut in 1949,
in order to supply brown coal to the adjoining briquette works, to supply the increase in power demands
post world war two. Mining operations initially commenced in 1955 in what is now known as the east
field, bounded at the north by the northern batters.
The Hazelwood mine was further developed from the late 1950s. Between 1964 and 1971, the
Hazelwood Power Station was built and demand for coal from the Hazelwood mine increased
dramatically. The Hazelwood pondage was constructed in the early 1970s to establish a supply of
cooling water for the Hazelwood Power Station. Mining of the east field continued until about 1980. The
Hazelwood mine then expanded to the south-west, then to the south-east and then west again, where
the operational area of the mine is now situated. Under the current proposed mining schedule, mining at
the Hazelwood mine will continue to the west and then to the north before the anticipated closure of the
mine in 2031.
The Victorian Government privatised the SECV in the early to mid-1990s, and its power stations were
sold separately to overseas interests.
The Hazelwood mine, including the land on which it operates, is owned by the Hazelwood Power
Partnership. Since 7 June 2013, the four partners have been subsidiaries of International Power
(Australia) Holdings Pty Ltd. This company is in turn jointly owned by subsidiaries of GDF Suez S.A. (72
per cent ownership) and Mitsui & Co Ltd (28 per cent ownership). GDF Suez S.A. is a global energy
company with corporate headquarters in France.
Fire is a well-known occurrence in mines in the Latrobe Valley, and there have been a number of fires in
the past ten years at the Hazelwood mine, most recently in 2005, 2006 and 2008. On each of these
occasions the fire initiated in a single location, rapidly increased in size, fanned by strong winds and took
a number of days to extinguish (Potter, 2008).
THE MINE
The Latrobe Valley currently contains three huge open cut brown coal mines. Open cut brown coal
mines are particularly vulnerable to fire. Laboratory reactivity tests place the coal in the exceptionally
high category (Beamish and Arisoy, 2008) due to its low rank. The coal is only stable when wet (inherent
moisture is about 60 % by weight). If the coal was dried, any fire initiated in the coal would spread
quickly and be difficult to extinguish. The coal is not stockpiled but burnt as soon as possible after being
1
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mined. Hazelwood open cut mine is shown in figure 1. The mine stretches approximately 5km from west
to east and about 2.5 km from south to north at the widest point. The area being extracted is located in
the south west of the pit.

Figure 1: Aerial view of the mine (Teague et al., 2014)
THE EVENT
Victoria experienced one of its hottest and driest summers on record in 2014. In mid-January 2014,
Melbourne endured its most prolonged heatwave since 1908, with four consecutive days over 40°C.
Between 7 and 9 February 2014, emergency services and firefighting resources were committed to
responding to multiple significant fires across the State and within the Latrobe Valley. The Fire Services
Commissioner and the Chief Health Officer made several announcements warning the community about
the potential for extreme weather conditions and associated fire and health risks. On 9 February 2014,
the entire State of Victoria was facing the most extreme weather conditions since Black Saturday.
This weather had the effect of drying out the abandoned areas of the mine leaving the exposed batters
in the north and east in a reactive state. The predominant wind at this time came from the
north-west/south-west that would tend to fan any fire along the exposed batters and the abandoned area
of the mine.
The Hazelwood mine fire that began on 9 February 2014 was the largest and longest burning mine fire
that has occurred in the Latrobe Valley to date. The fire was not a spontaneous combustion event. The
fire was probably caused by embers spotting into the Hazelwood mine from bushfires burning in close
proximity to the mine. The mine fire burned for 45 days and sent smoke and ash over the town of
Morwell and surrounding areas for much of that time.
The Hazelwood mine fire was not only a major complex fire emergency but also posed a serious public
health emergency.
The impact of the Hazelwood mine fire on the Latrobe Valley community has been significant. People
have been affected in many ways. First and foremost, the community has experienced adverse health
effects and may be affected for an indeterminate period into the future.
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In addition there have been significant financial impacts on many people, including medical costs,
veterinary costs, time taken off work, relocation from their homes and cleaning their homes. Local
businesses have suffered a downturn in business, and the costs of cleaning their businesses. There is
also the possible decrease in property values.
It is impossible to quantify the cost of the Hazelwood mine fire, but the Board of Inquiry estimated the
total cost borne by the Victorian Government, the local community and the operator of the Hazelwood
mine, GDF Suez, exceeds $100 million.
During the Inquiry, the State and GDF Suez expressed a commitment to undertake numerous additional
actions in response to the Hazelwood mine fire. The Board of Inquiry made 18 recommendations to the
State and GDF Suez, which have been drafted taking into account the feasibility of implementation, as
well as the issues raised by the Latrobe Valley community.
THE SOURCE OF THE FIRE
The Hazelwood mine fire was not just one fire, it started as a series of smaller fires that ignited in the
northern, eastern and south-eastern batters and floor of the Hazelwood mine on 9 February 2014.
There is difficulty in determining with precision which of the external fires was responsible for the
spotting of embers into the mine. On the evidence provided, spotting from the Hernes Oak fire was the
more likely cause of the Hazelwood mine fire, while spotting from the Driffield fire may have also
contributed. Both the Hernes Oak fire and the Driffield fire are regarded by Victoria Police as suspicious
and both are the subject of ongoing investigation.
The probability of embers spotting into the Hazelwood mine was supported by clear evidence from
several mine employees, contemporaneous photographs and video, expert evidence and computer
simulations of likely fire behaviour on 9 February 2014. Figure 2 shows possible fire sources and area of
the mine affected.

Figure 2: Possible sources of the fire and areas of the mine that burnt (Teauge et al., 2014)
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INQUIRY AND COMMENTS
The discussion on the causes of the fire and what can be done to minimise the potential for a repeat
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including mitigating any potential consequences is best framed in terms of the recommendations of the
Board of Inquiry.
The recommendations of the inquiry focus in two different areas: the State and GDF Suez, the operator
of the mine. The term ‘State’ is used broadly in the recommendations to refer to the Victorian
Government, the Victorian public service, and public entities such as Emergency Management Victoria,
the Country Fire Authority, the Environment Protection Authority and the Victorian WorkCover Authority.
Recommendations relevant to the State are generally not prescriptive in terms of the entity tasked with
implementation.
The first recommendation relates to mandating a plan to implement the recommendations of the Inquiry
and the commitments made by GDF SUEZ, and to report on the progress made in their implementation.
Recommendation 1
The State empowers and require the Auditor-General or another appropriate agency, to:



oversee the implementation of these recommendations and the commitments made by the
State and GDF Suez during this Inquiry; and
report publicly every year for the next three years on the progress made in implementing
recommendations and commitments.

The next two recommendations relate to the need to improve the rapidity and complexity of the response
to an incident by external agencies. It is interesting to note that most Queensland coal mines operate
emergency response plans based upon the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System
and it is the model recommended by the Mines Rescue Service of New South Wales.
Recommendation 2
The State establish, for any future incident, integrated incident management teams with
GDF Suez and other Victorian essential industry providers, to:



require that emergency services personnel work with GDF Suez and other appropriate essential
industry providers; and
implement the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System.

Recommendation 3
The State enact legislation, to:



require Integrated Fire Management Planning; and
authorise the Emergency Management Commissioner to develop and implement regional and
municipal fire management plans.

The next recommendation enhances the capacity of the legislation to consider the potential impacts of
fire on the adjacent community, and the capacity of the government to monitor compliance with this.
Recommendation 4
The State:



bring forward the commencement date of s.16 of the Mineral Resources (Sustainable
Development) Amendment Act 2014 (Vic), to facilitate the requirement that approved work
plans specifically address fire prevention, mitigation and suppression; and
acquire the expertise necessary to monitor and enforce compliance with fire risk measures
adopted by the Victorian coal mining industry under both the mine licensing and occupational
health and safety regimes.

One of the major issues identified was the time taken to assess the potential health impact of the smoke
from the fire on the population of Morwell. In particular the capacity to assess the potential health
impacts from fine particles sub 2.5 micrometres in diameter (PM 2.5) was recognised as being
inadequate. The Victorian EPA was not equipped to respond to the monitoring requirements of such a
308

11 – 13 February 2015

2015 Coal Operators’ Conference

The University of Wollongong

fire. Further, it was recognised that more work was needed to quantify the potential health impacts and
to try to establish a full national ambient air quality standard for PM2.5 rather than the current advisory
standard. The potential exposure of fire fighters to carbon monoxide from the fire was also a concern to
the Inquiry. Due to the level of uncertainty of the potential health impacts on the local population the
Inquiry recommended a long-term health study of the residents.
Recommendation 5
The State equip itself to undertake rapid air quality monitoring in any location in Victoria, to:



collect all relevant data, including data on PM2.5, carbon monoxide and ozone; and
ensure this data is used to inform decision-making within 24 hours of the incident occurring.

Recommendation 6
The State take the lead in advocating for a national compliance standard for PM2.5.
Recommendation 7
The State review and revise the community carbon monoxide response protocol and the firefighter
carbon monoxide response protocol, to:






ensure both protocols are consistent with each other;
ensure both protocols include assessment methods and trigger points for specific responses;
ensure GDF Suez and other appropriate essential industry providers are required to adopt and
apply the firefighter carbon monoxide protocol; and
inform all firefighters about the dangers of carbon monoxide poisoning, and in particular
highlight the increased risks for those with health conditions and those who are pregnant.

Recommendation 8
The State review and revise the Bushfire Smoke Protocol and the PM2.5 Health Protection Protocol, to:



ensure both protocols are consistent with each other; and
ensure both protocols include assessment methods and trigger points for specific responses.

Recommendation 9
The State develop and widely disseminate an integrated State Smoke Guide, to:




incorporate the proposed State Smoke Plan for the management of public health impacts from
large scale, extended smoke events;
include updated Bushfire Smoke, carbon monoxide and PM2.5 protocols; and
provide practical advice and support materials to employers, communities and individuals on
how to minimise the harmful effects of smoke.

Recommendation 10
The State should continue the long-term health study, and:




extend the study to at least 20 years;
appoint an independent board, which includes Latrobe Valley community representatives, to
govern the study; and
direct that the independent board publish regular progress reports.

Communications during the fire came under close scrutiny and there were a number of instances where
inadequate communications occurred between the various emergency response agencies and also by
the agencies with the public. Appropriate risk communication with the public is difficult to achieve and
relates not just to information but establishing and maintaining trust so that the information is accepted.
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Recommendation 11
The State review and revise its communication strategy, to:



ensure all emergency response agencies have, or have access to, the capability and resources
needed for effective and rapid public communications during an emergency; and
ensure, where appropriate, that private operators of essential infrastructure are included in the
coordination of public communications during an emergency concerning that infrastructure.

Recommendation 12
The State, led by Emergency Management Victoria, develop a community engagement model for
emergency management to ensure all State agencies and local governments engage with communities
and already identified trusted networks as an integral component of emergency management planning.
The remaining recommendations relate to improving the capacity of the mine operator to prevent and
control such an event in the future. Some of the recommendations relate to improved capacity in terms
of preparedness and equipment redundancy whilst others relate to improved planning and risk
assessment and control.
Recommendation 13
GDF Suez revise its Emergency Response Plan, to:





require an increased state of readiness on days of Total Fire Ban;
require pre-establishment of an Emergency Command Centre;
require pre-positioning of an accredited Incident Controller as Emergency Commander; and
require any persons nominated as Emergency Commander to have incident controller
accreditation and proficiency in the use of the Australasian Inter-service Incident Management
System.

Recommendation 14
GDF Suez establish enhanced back-up power supply arrangements that do not depend wholly on mains
power, to:



ensure that the Emergency Command Centre can continue to operate if mains power is lost;
and
ensure that the reticulated fire services water system can operate with minimal disruption if
mains power is lost.

Recommendation 15
GDF Suez:




conduct, assisted by an independent consultant, a risk assessment of the likelihood and
consequences of fire in the worked out areas of the Hazelwood mine, and an assessment of the
most effective fire protection for the exposed coal surfaces;
prepare an implementation plan that ensures the most effective and reasonably practicable
controls are in place to eliminate or reduce the risk of fire; and
implement the plan.

Recommendation 16
GDF Suez:
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review its ‘Mine Fire Service Policy and Code of Practice’ so that it reflects industry best practice
and ensures that, by taking a risk management approach, it is suitable for fire prevention,
mitigation and suppression in all parts of the Hazelwood mine; and
incorporate the revised ‘Mine Fire Service Policy and Code of Practice’ into the approved work
plan for the Hazelwood mine.
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Recommendation 17
GDF Suez adopt and apply the firefighter carbon monoxide response protocol.
Recommendation 18
GDF Suez improve its crisis management communication strategy for the Hazelwood mine in line with
international best practice.
CONCLUSION
The fire in the open cut at Hazelwood in February 2014 caused major disruption to the local community
as well as major costs to the state. The Board of Inquiry established to inquire into the incident found
that there were major deficiencies in the way the fire was treated. The Board of Inquiry did not accept the
position of the mine operator that the fire was not reasonably predictable – a “Perfect Storm”. It found
that more should have been done to prevent such an occurrence.
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